Η οικονομική κρίση που ξεκίνηση από τα στεγαστικά δάνεια στην Αμερική έχει φτάσει πλέον και στην Ευρώπη. Σήμερα το πρωϊ όλοι οι Ευρωπαϊκοί χρηματηστηριακοί δείκτες έχουν σημειώσει πτώση 10% περίπου και οι συναλλαγές γίνονται σε κλίμα πανικού. Κοινή πολιτική για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης δεν έχει χαραχθει: η συναίνεση, όπως σε άλλους τομείς (εξωτερική πολιτική κ.ο.κ) προσκρούει σε εθνικά συμφέροντα. Εν τω μεταξύ οι Ευρωπαϊκοί οικονομικοί θεσμοί δεν έχουν μεγάλο εύρως δράσεως και τα εργαλεία που έχουν στην διάθεση τους, τους δίνουν περιορισμένες δυνατότητες αντιμετώπισης της κρίσης.
Έτσι, Γαλλία και Γερμανία αδυνατούν να συμφωνήσουν σε μία κοινή προσέγγιση ωστε να αντιμετωπιστεί η κρίση, καθώς οι ιδιαιτερότητες του οικονομικού και τραπεζικού συστήματος τις καθεμίας επιβάλουν διαφορετικές πολιτικές. Οι εν λόγω θεσμικές διαφορές πρακτικά σημαίνουν ότι η Γερμανία μπορεί να δεσμευθεί σε ένα κοινό σχέδιο δράσης το οποίο ξέρει εκ των προτέρων ότι, εν δυνάμει, θα της επιβάλει διαδώση τραπεζών άλλων χωρών που δραστηριοποιούνται στο έδαφος της, το οποίο είναι "κόκκινη γραμμή" για την χώρα. Έτσι, δυστυχώς, οι διασώσεις τραπεζών που έχουν επιτευχθεί μέχρι σήμερα (δύο γερμανικών και μίας βελγικής), έχουν επιτευχθεί με τη σύμπραξη χωρών με συγγενή εθνική ταυτότητα: Λουξεμβούργο, Βέλγιο, Γερμανία. Η αδυναμία της κεντρικής ευρωπαϊκής τράπεζας να λάβει αποτελεσματικά μέτρα αντανακλά την εγγενή αδυναμία της Ένωσης: τα μέλη της δεν έχουν ξεπεράσει τις εθνικές τους διαφορές, και συνεπώς αδυνατούν να δημιουργήσουν υπερεθνικούς ευρωπαϊκούς θεσμούς των οποίων οι αποφάσεις θα έχουν δεσμευτικό χαρακτήρα για τα κράτη μέλη ώστε οι πολιτικές που χαράσονται να είναι αποδοτικές και να έχουν άμεσο πρακτικό αντίκρυσμα.
Friday, October 10, 2008
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Confessions of a Realist Mind
Goethe in Faust, explores mankind's existential with the following lines:
Two souls, alas, dwell within my breast, and their
Division tears my life in two.
One loves the world, it clutches her, it binds
Itself to her, clinging with furious lust;
The other longs to soar beyond the dust
Into the realm of high ancestral minds
The passage is meant to denote the dichotomy of self and the dichotomies of life. One aspect of us is bound to the earth, its realities and struggles. The other yearns to be free and escape the mundane, in a word, to transcend. The two meet when what was previously through "impossible" becomes possible.In a way that is how I feel about politics when divided between international and domestic politics. In the former my realist self manifests. In the latter, my realist. How can the two be reconciled?
In domestic politics i consider myself staunchly liberal. I believe in freedom of speech, expression and assembly. I believe in the rule of law, and I believe in equal opportunity. I believe the state should provide for the welfare of all, especially the weak, and should ensure that everybody has an equal shot in life by providing good education. Finally, citizens should have influence over power through representative institutions, and regular, fair elections. Violence is not an acceptable means of promoting one's interests and should be punished. Ultimately, the rule of law provides a framework within which everyone can pursue his or her goals, exercising constraint when constraint is due, and free from the fear of violent interference.
However, I am finding it very hard to translate all the above into the international realm. Not because I do not want to, but because the "realities" do not allow it. International politics has long been divided between "realists" and "idealists", the ones grounded in reality and the others willing to transcend it. Liberalism is such and idealist theory. It has had a long history, but the latest exposition of idealism can be found in the liberal theories of international relations, mainly espoused by American scholars. Given the right institutions, these theories tell us, we can have the same outcomes internationally as we have domestically. I am alarmed that, to me, the staunch liberal, this is a highly dubious suggestion. Even more dubious is the latest evolution of liberalism, hyper-liberalism. The idea that a country can "police" the world and promote liberal institutions, a proposition to which the neocons have added "by any means, and preferably by unilateral application of power." My professor Richard Betts argued that Americans are so liberal they do not realize how liberal they really are. Perhaps this is why liberal theories have such appeal within the US. Indeed, during my first year in school I watched in amusement as some of my well meaning fellow students argued for the war in Iraq based on these premises, only to be unable to answer when asked "how is liberal democracy, going to instilled by coercion in a country that does not will it."
The liberal argument and its latest manifestations, I would argue, are in fact based on a realist premises. That is why my realist self is in conflict with my idealist self. The latter argues for a better world, a world where conflict is more limited and resolved by negotiation and goodwill. The former questions how this is to be supported. The liberals, argues the realist in me, wish away the effects of anarchy. Domestic orders are possible because we have all agreed, because of the fear our enemies inspire in us, to shed a part of our freedom to the supreme sovereign. This allows a division of labor that in turn allows hierarchy and specialization. Liberals want to transcend the national borders and apply this internationally. But where is the supporting structure? My realist self fears that internationally we are doomed to the effects of anarchy and bound by necessity to the use of force. And while all politics is power politics, internationally power involves violence, in contrast to the domestic politics where conflicts are resolved before they reach violent stages. In other words, in domestic politics, fear of enemies is the catalyst for the creation of institutions that ensure stability, while in the international realm fear of enemies and uncertainty of their motives leads states to resort to violence.
Thus, my realist self is afraid that when stability and prosperity occurs in the international realm, it is merely delusional or at least temporary. Or, rather it is frail, exactly because it is not, and cannot be, supported by robust institutions. Where it manifests itself, it is because realist premises have been fulfilled. There is a hierarchy of needs, the first of which is self-preservation. Once it is achieved everything else follows. Likewise in the international arena stable orders engender areas of stability; they permit security and trade and all the benefits of peaceful co-existence. Because of the frailty of such orders however, conflict always lurks in the background. Liberals - of all shades and across time - have repeatedly fallen in the same trap: they assume that the "current" is "universal". Perhaps people have too short memories. During the prosperous years 1815-1914, various scholars thought the era of conflict was now over - war was something of the past. Yet soon enough, humans fought for reasons that are surprisingly recurrent in human history. The Europeans fought because they were afraid of each other: England and France as superpowers, were refusing to acknowledge the rise of Germany which would soon make it their peer. For almost the same reasons, Athens fought Sparta (Thucydides reminds as that the reason behind the conflict was the "rising power of Athens that feared Sparta"), and Rome fought Carthage.
The realist self then, cant help but think that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and that is where his optimism lies. I think that it is futile to try to wish away the realities the international system imposes on us. We should rather acknowledge them, and remember the ubiquity of conflict, or of the threat of conflict. Only orders constructed on realistic foundations can last in time; only orders founded on realistic foundations can limit the scope of conflict when this occurs. Only then can we transcend and make the impossible, possible.
Two souls, alas, dwell within my breast, and their
Division tears my life in two.
One loves the world, it clutches her, it binds
Itself to her, clinging with furious lust;
The other longs to soar beyond the dust
Into the realm of high ancestral minds
The passage is meant to denote the dichotomy of self and the dichotomies of life. One aspect of us is bound to the earth, its realities and struggles. The other yearns to be free and escape the mundane, in a word, to transcend. The two meet when what was previously through "impossible" becomes possible.In a way that is how I feel about politics when divided between international and domestic politics. In the former my realist self manifests. In the latter, my realist. How can the two be reconciled?
In domestic politics i consider myself staunchly liberal. I believe in freedom of speech, expression and assembly. I believe in the rule of law, and I believe in equal opportunity. I believe the state should provide for the welfare of all, especially the weak, and should ensure that everybody has an equal shot in life by providing good education. Finally, citizens should have influence over power through representative institutions, and regular, fair elections. Violence is not an acceptable means of promoting one's interests and should be punished. Ultimately, the rule of law provides a framework within which everyone can pursue his or her goals, exercising constraint when constraint is due, and free from the fear of violent interference.
However, I am finding it very hard to translate all the above into the international realm. Not because I do not want to, but because the "realities" do not allow it. International politics has long been divided between "realists" and "idealists", the ones grounded in reality and the others willing to transcend it. Liberalism is such and idealist theory. It has had a long history, but the latest exposition of idealism can be found in the liberal theories of international relations, mainly espoused by American scholars. Given the right institutions, these theories tell us, we can have the same outcomes internationally as we have domestically. I am alarmed that, to me, the staunch liberal, this is a highly dubious suggestion. Even more dubious is the latest evolution of liberalism, hyper-liberalism. The idea that a country can "police" the world and promote liberal institutions, a proposition to which the neocons have added "by any means, and preferably by unilateral application of power." My professor Richard Betts argued that Americans are so liberal they do not realize how liberal they really are. Perhaps this is why liberal theories have such appeal within the US. Indeed, during my first year in school I watched in amusement as some of my well meaning fellow students argued for the war in Iraq based on these premises, only to be unable to answer when asked "how is liberal democracy, going to instilled by coercion in a country that does not will it."
The liberal argument and its latest manifestations, I would argue, are in fact based on a realist premises. That is why my realist self is in conflict with my idealist self. The latter argues for a better world, a world where conflict is more limited and resolved by negotiation and goodwill. The former questions how this is to be supported. The liberals, argues the realist in me, wish away the effects of anarchy. Domestic orders are possible because we have all agreed, because of the fear our enemies inspire in us, to shed a part of our freedom to the supreme sovereign. This allows a division of labor that in turn allows hierarchy and specialization. Liberals want to transcend the national borders and apply this internationally. But where is the supporting structure? My realist self fears that internationally we are doomed to the effects of anarchy and bound by necessity to the use of force. And while all politics is power politics, internationally power involves violence, in contrast to the domestic politics where conflicts are resolved before they reach violent stages. In other words, in domestic politics, fear of enemies is the catalyst for the creation of institutions that ensure stability, while in the international realm fear of enemies and uncertainty of their motives leads states to resort to violence.
Thus, my realist self is afraid that when stability and prosperity occurs in the international realm, it is merely delusional or at least temporary. Or, rather it is frail, exactly because it is not, and cannot be, supported by robust institutions. Where it manifests itself, it is because realist premises have been fulfilled. There is a hierarchy of needs, the first of which is self-preservation. Once it is achieved everything else follows. Likewise in the international arena stable orders engender areas of stability; they permit security and trade and all the benefits of peaceful co-existence. Because of the frailty of such orders however, conflict always lurks in the background. Liberals - of all shades and across time - have repeatedly fallen in the same trap: they assume that the "current" is "universal". Perhaps people have too short memories. During the prosperous years 1815-1914, various scholars thought the era of conflict was now over - war was something of the past. Yet soon enough, humans fought for reasons that are surprisingly recurrent in human history. The Europeans fought because they were afraid of each other: England and France as superpowers, were refusing to acknowledge the rise of Germany which would soon make it their peer. For almost the same reasons, Athens fought Sparta (Thucydides reminds as that the reason behind the conflict was the "rising power of Athens that feared Sparta"), and Rome fought Carthage.
The realist self then, cant help but think that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and that is where his optimism lies. I think that it is futile to try to wish away the realities the international system imposes on us. We should rather acknowledge them, and remember the ubiquity of conflict, or of the threat of conflict. Only orders constructed on realistic foundations can last in time; only orders founded on realistic foundations can limit the scope of conflict when this occurs. Only then can we transcend and make the impossible, possible.
Sunday, July 1, 2007
Big Governments, Big Errors
America's founding fathers were thought to be against big governments. They held that a necessary evil of government is corruption, and the greater the government the more extensive the corruption. The role of the state should be to regulate the operation of the free market, and act as the enforcer to punish those who break the law, also deterring others from breaking it.
Much later Milton Friedman stipulated that "government is the will of the individual to live at the expense of others". Taken literally this may seem somewhat excessive. But in countries with large governments it is surprisingly accurate: individuals expect the government "to take care of things", and the perennial complaint is that the "government should do something". Government becomes the deus ex machina that will save us all by remedying problems through bloated, expensive bureaucracies.
These thoughts I have had for a long time; indeed at times I may have seemed graphic among friends in blaming the corrupt Greek bureaucracy for the evils of Greek society. But i still think I am right, and I still see the public sector in Greece as the perpetrator of many of the country's evils.
The latest manifestation of the state's malfeasance is tragic indeed. The last big forest around over-polluted Athens - Parnitha - burned in its entirety in a fire last week. Already environmental scientists and other experts are making grim predictions about what is to come for the city. Increased temperatures, floods (as the forest will no longer absorb the water), land corrosion, and still greater pollution. Fires happen of course. But this fire happened in a distinctly Greek way.
What has emerged so far is that the public power company - which has supply lines running through the forest - had not properly maintained them. Dirt had accumulated on one of the power lines, and some sparks started the fire. The fire trucks came, but the hose didn’t work properly, and they had to go. Two airplanes made two water-drops just before dawn and then . . . nothing happens. It later emerged that the director of the emergency services of Greece (the equivalent of FEMA) is not on talking terms (!) with the head of the fire services because of jurisdictional disputes. Then it emerged that the head of the fire services, who was appointed by the new government, fired experienced and able high ranking officers and in their place hired people affiliated to labor unions loyal to the governing party. In turn, funds for the preparations for the fires of the summer season where allocated to districts according to party affiliation, not objective need.
All the above is typical of how the Greek government works. The huge and ineffective bureaucracy is not independent. Every time the party in government changes, it changes the heads of the various departments and the new heads change their deputies. The new deputies change those below them, and so on down to the lowest ranking employee. Of course, this serves to buy votes and appoint party loyalists to redundant, overpaid government positions. Thus the bureaucracy becomes a political device for granting favors and hiring people. Anyone who knows someone, who knows someone, who knows someone can get a favor and surely enough he will cast a vote for the party that did him the favor. Such is the cycle of corruption in Greece. And it makes me wonder: had that not been the case, would have Parnitha burned?
Much later Milton Friedman stipulated that "government is the will of the individual to live at the expense of others". Taken literally this may seem somewhat excessive. But in countries with large governments it is surprisingly accurate: individuals expect the government "to take care of things", and the perennial complaint is that the "government should do something". Government becomes the deus ex machina that will save us all by remedying problems through bloated, expensive bureaucracies.
These thoughts I have had for a long time; indeed at times I may have seemed graphic among friends in blaming the corrupt Greek bureaucracy for the evils of Greek society. But i still think I am right, and I still see the public sector in Greece as the perpetrator of many of the country's evils.
The latest manifestation of the state's malfeasance is tragic indeed. The last big forest around over-polluted Athens - Parnitha - burned in its entirety in a fire last week. Already environmental scientists and other experts are making grim predictions about what is to come for the city. Increased temperatures, floods (as the forest will no longer absorb the water), land corrosion, and still greater pollution. Fires happen of course. But this fire happened in a distinctly Greek way.
What has emerged so far is that the public power company - which has supply lines running through the forest - had not properly maintained them. Dirt had accumulated on one of the power lines, and some sparks started the fire. The fire trucks came, but the hose didn’t work properly, and they had to go. Two airplanes made two water-drops just before dawn and then . . . nothing happens. It later emerged that the director of the emergency services of Greece (the equivalent of FEMA) is not on talking terms (!) with the head of the fire services because of jurisdictional disputes. Then it emerged that the head of the fire services, who was appointed by the new government, fired experienced and able high ranking officers and in their place hired people affiliated to labor unions loyal to the governing party. In turn, funds for the preparations for the fires of the summer season where allocated to districts according to party affiliation, not objective need.
All the above is typical of how the Greek government works. The huge and ineffective bureaucracy is not independent. Every time the party in government changes, it changes the heads of the various departments and the new heads change their deputies. The new deputies change those below them, and so on down to the lowest ranking employee. Of course, this serves to buy votes and appoint party loyalists to redundant, overpaid government positions. Thus the bureaucracy becomes a political device for granting favors and hiring people. Anyone who knows someone, who knows someone, who knows someone can get a favor and surely enough he will cast a vote for the party that did him the favor. Such is the cycle of corruption in Greece. And it makes me wonder: had that not been the case, would have Parnitha burned?
Monday, May 7, 2007
Reflections on oil and autocracy in the Middle East.
After the 1973 international financial crisis, the oil producing countries formed OPEC in an attempt to control their prices and increase their share of the surplus resulting from oil production. Indeed prices increased and huge profits accumulated to the producers. Contrary to hopes for the opposite, this increase surplus did not change the realities for the peoples of the region or the understandings between the West, the local elites and the oil Companies. In Saudi Arabia for example, the tacit understanding was that the Saudi Kingdom benefited from the enormous profits, the American companies continued “to enjoy a privileged position in their relation with the oil industry”, and the US continued to enjoy its strategic position in the country. The US also benefited from the growth of the Saudi economy, as the latter fueled demand for consumer goods and American investment, as well as weapons procurement that required training by American experts. Throughout the Middle East, the oil price increases led to little or no increases in the wealth of the people of these societies. None of these countries had been a democracy, and the increased flows of revenue strengthened the predispositions of the Middle Eastern states towards centralization. Thus, states became stronger and more repressive, new state structures emerged and the elites became harder to remove. Instead of a share of the increased revenues flowing to the people of the Middle Eastern countries, it “ended up supporting a vast system of patronage and corruption that upheld” the dominant class. States grew larger and “dominated the society and economy”, while “blotting out in many cases the possibility of real steps toward a more open society”. The oil revenues also resulted in increased dependency of the citizens to the state and of the state to external patrons. The former for more handouts or access to power and the latter for protection against the local rivals and for weapons procurement.
Sunday, May 6, 2007
The French Election
The right candidate Nicholas Sarkozy, won the French national election in France today. I am happy he did.
France's problems are typical of the problems plaguing many European countries. Stagnating economies, slow growth, even less innovation and investment, a large unassimilated immigrant population, and a crumbling, expensive social welfare state. In Frace the social contract was a peculiar one indeed: the people, dissapointed, voted the same people over and over. . .and over. The tacit understanding was that the elected politicians would not improve the economic conditions in the country, but at the same time they would not touch the social welfare provisions. It is clearly an unsustainable bargain.
This is why Sarkozy's victory is important. He is an unusual politician. He is a protectionist in industrial matters. He is a liberal in employment. He is against the 35 hour week, which was one of the culprits of France's slow growth, and talks about tax cuts. At the same time he advocates increases in pensions of the order of 30%. He has been silent on sensitive issues such as immigration and integration of second generation immigrants to win votes from the far right. He has at the same time talked about an inclusive French national identity. This victory is important, because it indicates that French voters, in want of change, were ready to support an unsual candidate. And supported him they did.
If Mr. Sarkozy's is able to push his programs through despite the opposition they might spur, and if they are ultimately successful, they may set a new example for Europe.
France's problems are typical of the problems plaguing many European countries. Stagnating economies, slow growth, even less innovation and investment, a large unassimilated immigrant population, and a crumbling, expensive social welfare state. In Frace the social contract was a peculiar one indeed: the people, dissapointed, voted the same people over and over. . .and over. The tacit understanding was that the elected politicians would not improve the economic conditions in the country, but at the same time they would not touch the social welfare provisions. It is clearly an unsustainable bargain.
This is why Sarkozy's victory is important. He is an unusual politician. He is a protectionist in industrial matters. He is a liberal in employment. He is against the 35 hour week, which was one of the culprits of France's slow growth, and talks about tax cuts. At the same time he advocates increases in pensions of the order of 30%. He has been silent on sensitive issues such as immigration and integration of second generation immigrants to win votes from the far right. He has at the same time talked about an inclusive French national identity. This victory is important, because it indicates that French voters, in want of change, were ready to support an unsual candidate. And supported him they did.
If Mr. Sarkozy's is able to push his programs through despite the opposition they might spur, and if they are ultimately successful, they may set a new example for Europe.
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